SAMANYA,
SARUPYA, AND SADRSYA (T. Takenaka)
view. We, however, know some Jaina philosophers held that samanya (the universal) is sad rsya. Before examining Kumarila's criticism of the sad rsya theory, I would like to make clear the basic conception of sad rsya in the Jaina school.
Manikyanandin (9th c. A. D.), a Jaina philosopher, divided samanya into two kinds, viz., tiryaksamanya and urd hvatasamanya. He explains the former as follows:"Tiryaksamanya is a similar modification (sadrsaparinama), for example, cowness (gotva) in individual cows like khanda, munda, etc."6) Prabhacandra (980-1065 A. D.), who comments on Manikyanandin's Pariksamukhasutra, while regarding sad rsaparinama as the cause of the universal notion (anuvrttipratyaya) which covers individuals, defines it to be non-eternal (anitya), non-ubiquitous (asarvagata), many (aneka) as a property of each individual, different (vibhinna) in each individual, and perceptible (pratyaksa) like colour, etc7). Knowing this,
we can understand the difference between the Jaina conception of samanya and Kumarila's. As for Kumarila, he also regards samanya as the cause of the universal notion, but he considers it to be eternal (nitya), ubiquitous (sarvagata), and one (eka) as the common nature of many individuals8).
Having elucidated the Jaina conception of sad rsya, I will proceed to examine Kumarila's criticism of the sad rsya theory. Obviously, we cannot say one thing is similar to another without an object or objects to which the first can be Next Kumarila discusses a supposed response to his criticism by those who try to establish similarity between individuals"). They insist that there is similarity on account of a similar form of individuals. Jayamisra mentions two defects of this view. First, the similarity based on the similar form of individuals is not necessarily found everywhere, even in the same class of incividuals, while the universal is found in every individual. Among individual cows which belong to the same class, there are some cases where some cows lack some parts, legs, horns, etc. In this case we cannot find the similarity between them -504-and other cows having all parts. Secondly, even though we were to accept the similarity advocated by them, the knowledge based on it would be "This is similar to that", not the universal notion which covers all the individuals belonging to the same class12). So long as Kumarila holds the universal causes the universal notion, it is natural that he should refuse to admit that similarity, which does not have such a function, is the universal.
Prabhacandra's following statement seems to be an answer to the above criticism. That is, "[when the universal is defined to be similarity (sadrsya),
we can explain the universal notion,] because we secondarily admit identity (ekatva) between different individuals." He distinguishes between two kinds of identity, , viz., primary (mukha) and secondary (upacarita)13). Because different individuals of the same class have a similar form, the similarity based on it can be regarded as secondary identity, which causes the universal notion.
Kumarila does not refer to this view of the Jainas, but he seems to presuppose a similar view and rejects it. "The universal notion Cow' is not caused by the we cannot prove the universal notion to asise from similarity, we cannot regard the latter as the universal. Thus we can say that the heart of Kumarila's criticism of the similarity theory consists in pointing out the impossibility of arriving at the universal notion on the basis of similarity.
Next Kumarila described another view that there was a standard individual that appeared in the world prior" to any other member of its class, and that similarity to it causes the universal notion. Kumarila's criticism of this view amounts to the following four points18):
1) It is impossible to admit the very exitsence of such a standard individual that is said to be known to everybody.
2) Even if we admit its existence, similarity to it cannot cause the universal notion, for it can only cause the notion "This is similar to that."
3) We cannot explain what the standard individual 'is.
4) Even if it is said to have been created by God, we moderners cannot determine whether the present individuals are similar to it or not, for we cannot perceive it today.
Finally he declares that similarity -itself could never be recognized without the universal19). 
